Modeling all aspects of a complex system within a single model is a difficult, if not impossible, task. Multi-view modeling is a methodology where different aspects of the system are captured by different models, or views. A key question then is consistency: if different views of a system have some degree of overlap, how can we guarantee that they are consistent, i.e., that they do not contradict each other? In this paper we formulate this and other basic problems in multi-view modeling within an abstract formal framework. We then instantiate this framework onto several discrete system settings: languages and automata over finite and infinite words, and symbolic transition systems; and study how checking view consistency and other problems can be solved in these settings.
Introduction
Complex systems are designed and developed not by a single person, and often not even by a single team, but by multiple teams, coming from different disciplines. For example, designing an automated vehicle might involve control engineers, mechanical engineers, and software engineers, all working on the same project. Other stakeholders might include cost managers, marketing, legal, and other teams. Each of these teams has its own concerns and goals about the target system. Each team focuses on a different aspect of the system, and no team has a complete grasp of all the details of the design. Modeling and simulation are often used to support system design. This is especially true for engineering teams, who increasingly adopt model-based design approaches. In such an approach, a model of the system is built and analyzed (usually by simulation) in order to find design defects and fix them as early as possible in the design process. In such a model-based design setting, a view is a model. In this paper, when we talk about views, we refer concretely to the different models of a system that designers build.
When teams from different disciplines are involved in the same project, they typically use different types of modeling languages and tools to build their models. For example, the control engineers may use Simulink, the mechanical engineers may use Modelica, and the software engineers may use UML [7] . Checking consistency of views would then mean comparing and relating models written in these different languages. This is a difficult task, however, as it resembles comparing apples and oranges. Even if a single modeling language and tool is used, the problem of view consistency is still not well defined, as the models built by the different teams are likely to refer to different aspects of the system and thus are unlikely to be directly comparable. Multi-view modeling (MVM) refers to the class of problems that arise in such situations.
The first goal of this work is to provide a formal MVM framework. We want to define what views are, and what view consistency means. We achieve this by proposing an abstract framework where a system is a set S of behaviors from a given domain U, and a view is a set V of view behaviors from a view domain D. An abstraction function a : U → D maps system behaviors to view behaviors, thus linking the two domains. The abstraction function models the fact that the view is only a partial or incomplete picture of the system, focusing on certain aspects and omitting others. 1 For example, an energy consumption model for an airplane might ignore software engineering aspects. Typically, there will be not one, but many view domains, D 1 , . . . , D n , and many abstraction functions, a 1 , . . . , a n , one for each domain,
When we know the system S, we can obtain a view V i ⊆ D i , by applying the corresponding abstraction function a i (lifted to sets): V i = a i (S). The interesting case is when we don't have S, but only have a set of views V 1 , . . . , V n , one from each domain, V i ⊆ D i . Typically, each of these V i 's will be design models for the system-to-be-built, S. For instance, in the airplane example mentioned above, an energy consumption model may be developed even before the airplane is built. Then, we say that the views V 1 , . . . , V n are consistent if, and only if, there exists a system S such that V i = a i (S), for i = 1, . . . , n. Such an S is called a witness system and captures the system-to-be-built. If no such witness exists, there is clearly some inconsistency between the different views.
Before listing other contributions of this paper, we illustrate the concept of views with two examples.
Example: 3D objects
Consider the 3D structure shown at the left of Fig. 1 . It can be modeled as a set of points in a 4 × 4 × 4 space, each point (x, y, z) representing a "box" appearing at coordinate (x, y, z), for x, y, z ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. The object shown to the left of the figure contains 16 such boxes, and the corresponding set contains 16 points. Three views of the object are shown to the right of the figure: a top view, a front view, and a side view. These views can be formalized as 2D projections. Let S be the set of points representing the 3D object. Then the three views can be formalized as sets V top , V front , V side , where The above projections can be seen as abstractions of S. In fact, they are generally strict abstractions in the sense that some information about S is lost during the abstraction. In the case of Fig. 1 , e.g., the same views would be obtained if one were to add to the object the missing boxes so that no box under the "staircase structure" hangs in the air.
In this example, S represents the "system," and the 2D projections represent three "views" of S. Of course, this example is not very relevant for the types of applications we are interested in, which involve dynamical systems, rather than static geometric objects. However, the example is still useful as it illustrates some basic concepts and problems in multi-view modeling. For example, one problem is, given the system, how to generate the views. A more interesting problem is the inverse: What if we have the views, but we don't have the system? This is typically the case in real-world system engineering projects, where only the views are available, while the system is being built. These views correspond to the different models developed by the various project teams. A key question is whether these models are consistent with each other. In our geometric example, for instance ( Fig. 1) , what if the top square was missing from the right view? Then, the three views would be inconsistent, as there is no 3D object which could possibly generate them. One of the goals of a multi-view modeling framework, and associated tools, is to be able to express and catch such inconsistencies. The framework presented in this paper allows to do that. The framework is general enough to apply not only to static objects like in the example above, but also to systems with dynamic behavior, as the next example illustrates.
Example: functional and timing views of a circuit
We now illustrate our framework on a dynamical system setting, where views and systems are not static, as in the previous example, but have dynamic behaviors. Consider a digital circuit with inputs c and x and outputs r and y, as shown to the left of Fig. 2 . Both c and r are Booleans, whereas x and y are vectors of Booleans of an appropriate size. The goal of the circuit is to perform, say, some arithmetic computation and compute y = f (x), for some function f . The input c is the "control" signal, which triggers the computation when it becomes true. The input x represents the data input. Output r signals that the data output y is "ready."
Two views for this circuit are shown in the middle and right of Fig. 2 . We call them the "functional" view and the "timing" view. The functional view is supposed to describe the function of the circuit, i.e., the computation y = f (x). However, since we are not really interested in what f does, we leave f undefined in Fig. 2 . The timing view is supposed to describe the precise timing of the control signals and also implicitly describe how long it takes for the circuit to perform the computation.
Let us first consider the functional view. It is modeled in Fig. 2 as an automaton whose transitions are annotated with expressions on the input and output variables (a denotes the negation/complement of Boolean variable a, and ∧ denotes logical conjunction). Our goal here is not to define a pre- 
where we use * as a "wild character" corresponding to any value, and x 1 is an arbitrary value for the data input x. In this set of behaviors, c is initially false, for a number of steps. During those steps, the values of the other variables can be anything, since they are not constrained by the automaton, which takes the self-loop transition in its initial state. After that, c is true and the automaton moves to the other state. It stays there for a number of cycles, during which the output r is false. Finally, the transition returning to the initial state is taken, and r is set to true, and the output y is set to f (x 1 ), assuming that the input x is x 1 . Similarly, the timing view describes a set of behaviors of the form:
where we ignore the x and y variables, since they are not mentioned at all in the timing view. This means that these variables are unconstrained and can take any value. One important question is whether these two views are consistent. Such questions can be formulated precisely in our framework. In particular, consistency means the existence of a system that can "generate" those views. Both views and systems in our framework are sets of behaviors, which in this example are infinite sequences of vectors of the form (c, r , x, y). Often, the behaviors of a view are abstractions of those of the system. For instance, the behaviors of the timing view can be seen as projections of the behaviors of the circuit, on only the two variables c and r . Does there exist a circuit which can generate the views of Fig. 2 ? The answer to this question depends on another parameter in our framework, namely, how exactly we define conformance between a system and the view. In the strictest sense, the set of behaviors of the system, after abstraction, must exactly match, i.e., be equal to, the set of behaviors of the view. If we adopt this strict view, then the two views are inconsistent, meaning that no circuit exists that can generate exactly these two views. The reason for this is the following. According to the timing view, the circuit must contain only behaviors of the form in (2) . But according to the functional view, the circuit must also contain behaviors of the form in (1). Specifically, it must contain all possible behaviors of that form, including, say, the behavior c r c r · · ·
where we omitted the x and y variables for simplicity. In (3), the * in the r position has been replaced by setting r to true. But this is incompatible with (2), which states for instance that whenever c is false r must also be false, and also that once c becomes true, r must remain false for two steps before becoming true. We may attempt to fix the inconsistency by modifying the functional view automaton as shown in Fig. 3 . However, this change does not solve the inconsistency. Indeed, this is because the functional view still allows behaviors with an arbitrary number of c ∧ r steps, whereas the timing view only allows two such steps before r becomes true.
The solution is to require, for the functional view, a less strict notion of conformance. Specifically, we may regard the functional view as an overapproximation of the set of behaviors of the circuit, instead of the exact set of behaviors. Then, the circuit's behaviors are allowed to be a subset of those of the view. Our framework allows both the strict and the subset-based notions of conformance, as well as many others. Using this subset-based notion for the functional view, and the strict notion for the timing view, the views are consistent.
Paper contributions and organization
The complete formal framework for multi-view modeling is presented in Sect. 2. Apart from the concepts already mentioned above, the framework also introduces a notion of conformance, which formalizes how "faithful" a view is to a system, and therefore allows more flexibility when defining the relation between system and views. In particular, it allows V i to be not necessarily equal to a i (S), as in the requirement V i = a i (S) stated above. Section 2 also defines the concepts of view reduction (which allows to "optimize" some views by using the information contained in other views) and orthogonality (which captures independence between views). Finally, Sect. 2 lists several basic verification and synthesis problems in MVM.
The framework proposed in Sect. 2 is abstract, in the sense that it does not refer to specific notions of behaviors, neither to concrete representations of systems and views. In Sects. 3 4 we instantiate this abstract framework to different discrete system settings:
• In Sect. 3: to the setting of symbolic discrete systems.
These are finite-state transition systems described symbolically, by a finite set of variables of Boolean type, and two predicates: a predicate over the state variables characterizing the set of initial states, and a predicate over the state and next-state variables characterizing the transition relation. In this setting, abstraction functions are defined as projections of the state space obtained by removing or hiding some of the variables.
• In Sect. 4: to the setting of formal languages and automata over finite and infinite words. Abstraction functions here too are defined as projections, but of a different type, where some letters are removed from the word.
In both settings we show how to solve algorithmic problems such as view consistency checking and study their computational complexity.
Related work is discussed in Sect. 5. Conclusions and future work are presented in Sect. 6. Proofs missing from the main text can be found in the appendix.
2 Views: a formal framework
Systems
We define a system semantically, as a set of behaviors. As in [38] , there is no restriction on the type of behaviors: they could be discrete traces, continuous trajectories, hybrid traces, or something else. We only assume given a domain of possible behaviors, U. Then, a system S over domain of behaviors U is a subset of U: S ⊆ U.
View domains
A view is intuitively an "incomplete picture" of a system. It can be incomplete in different ways:
• Some behaviors may be missing from the view, i.e., the view may contain only a subset of system behaviors. (As we shall see when we discuss conformance, the view may also be a superset.) • Some parts of a behavior itself may be missing in the view. E.g., if the behavior refers to a state vector with, say, 10 state variables, the view could refer only to 2 state variables. In this case the view can be seen as a projection.
• More generally, the view may be obtained by some other kind of transformation (not necessarily a projection) to behaviors. E.g., the original system behaviors may contain temperature as a state variable, but the view only contains temperature averages over some period of time.
From the above discussion, it appears that: semantically, views can be formalized as sets of behaviors, just like systems are. However, because of projections or other transformations, the domain of behaviors of a view is not necessarily the same as the domain of system behaviors, U. Therefore, we let D i be the domain of behaviors of view i. (There can be more than one view, hence the subscript i.) When we refer to a general view domain, we drop the subscript and simply write D.
In the case of our running example, U = {1, 2, 3, 4} × {1, 2, 3, 4}×{1, 2, 3, 4} = {1, 2, 3, 4} 3 , and
Views
A view is a set of behaviors over a given view domain. That is, a view V over view domain D is defined to be a subset of
Abstraction functions
Given a domain of behaviors U and a view domain D, we would like to relate systems over U and views over D. In order to do this, we will first introduce abstraction functions, which map behaviors from U to D. An abstraction function from U to D is defined to be a mapping a : U → D. Abstraction functions can be projections or other types of transformations, as discussed above.
In the case of our running example, the abstraction functions a top , a front , a side are 3D-to-2D projections on the corresponding planes.
An abstraction function a can be naturally "lifted" from behaviors to systems. If S ⊆ U, then a(S) is defined to be:
Conformance
Given system S ⊆ U, view V ⊆ D, and abstraction function a : U → D, we say that V is a complete view of S w.r.t. a if V = a(S). The notion of complete view is a reasonable way of capturing how "faithful" a given view is to a certain system. For example, if S is an object containing two boxes, S = {(1, 1, 1), (2, 2, 2)} and a top is the top view, then V 1 = {(1, 1), (2, 2)} is complete w.r.t. a top , whereas V 2 = {(2, 2)} and
But faithfulness need not always require a strict equality as in the condition V = a(S). Depending on the usage one makes of a view, weaker conditions may be appropriate. Because of this, we introduce the notion of conformance. Conformance is defined with respect to a partial order on the set of all views over view domain D. That is, is a partial order on 2 D , the powerset of D. Then, we say that V conforms to S w.r.
t. a and , denoted V a S, if V a(S).
For example, if one uses the top view to decide whether it is safe to drop a box to the floor without touching another box during landing, then a view that safely approximates the set of free (x, y) positions could be acceptable. In this case, the partial order is ⊇, i.e., conformance is defined as V ⊇ a top (S). Indeed, dropping a box to (x, y) / ∈ V would be safe, since (x, y) / ∈ V and V ⊇ a top (S) imply (x, y) / ∈ a top (S). In another scenario, it may be more appropriate to require that the view under-approximates a(S) and thus over-approximates the set of free (x, y) positions. For example, if one uses the top view to decide whether it is safe to drop an object so that it does not hit the floor, then it is more appropriate to define conformance as V ⊆ a top (S). In this case, is ⊆.
This definition of conformance is also able to capture the fact that views, in addition to containing projected/abstracted behaviors, may also contain a subset of the original system behaviors, as discussed above.
An alternative formalization: starting with conformance
In the way we formalized things so far, we started with an abstraction function a and a partial order , and defined the conformance relation a with respect to those. As an alternative, we can start with a conformance relation | ⊆ 2 D × 2 U , which relates a view V and a system S, i.e., V | S, and derive an abstraction function a. We can do this provided that | satisfies the conditions described below, and that the domain of views equipped with , denoted (2 D , ), forms a complete lattice. Let denote the greatest lower bound in this lattice. Note that the interpretation of the lattice is that the smaller an element the more accurate it is, and x y says that y is smaller than x. Therefore, when is ⊇, top is D, bottom is ∅, and is . When is ⊆, is . Then, | induces an abstraction function a defined as follows:
For this to work, however, we need | to have the two following properties:
Condition 1 says that if V 1 conforms to S, then any view greater than V 1 also conforms to S. Condition 2 says that if a set of views all conform to a system S, then their greatest lower bound also conforms to S. Any relation a defined by an abstraction function a and an order forming a complete lattice has these two properties by construction.
Consistency
It is often the case in practice that S is not available. Instead, only some views of S are available. The goal may be in fact to design S based on the views. This is typical in real-life projects, where every design team has its own view (and corresponding designs/models), whereas no team has a complete model for the entire system. In this scenario, the notion of consistency becomes particularly important, and we formalize it next. Consider a set of views,
sider given a conformance relation | i (which could be derived from given abstraction function a i and partial order i , or defined as a primitive notion as explained above). We say that V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V n are consistent w.r.t. | 1 , | 2 , . . . , | n if there exists a system S over U such that ∀i = 1, . . . , n : V i | i S. We call such a system S a witness to the consistency of V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V n . Clearly, if no such S exists, then one must conclude that the views are inconsistent, as there is no system from which these views could be derived. When | i is derived from a i and i , and i is = for all i, i.e., when V i = a i (S) for all i, we say that V 1 , . . . , V n are strictly consistent. Note that if i is ⊇ for all i, then consistency trivially holds as the empty system is a witness, since V i ⊇ ∅ = a i (∅) for all i. Also, if i is ⊆ for all i and every a i satisfies a i (U) = D i , then consistency trivially holds as the system U is a witness,
In our 3D objects example, if V top is non-empty, but V side is empty, then the two views are inconsistent w.r.t. strict conformance V = a(S). A less trivial case is when V top = {(1, 1)} and V side = {(2, 2)}. Again the two views are inconsistent (w.r.t. =): V top asserts that some box must be in the column with (x, y) coordinates (1, 1), but V side implies that there is no box whose y coordinate is 1.
The last example may mislead to believe that consistency (w.r.t. =) is equivalent to "intersection of inverse projection of views being non-empty." This is not true. Even in the case where abstraction functions are projections, non-empty intersection of inverse projections is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for consistency. To see this, consider views V top = {(1, 1), (3, 3)} and V side = {(2, 2), (1, 2)} in the context of our running example. These two views are inconsistent w.r.t. =. Yet the intersection of their inverse projections is non-empty and equal to {(1, 1, 2)}. Proof (Here and elsewhere in this paper the symbol denotes end of proof.) S 1 and S 2 being witness to consistency w.r.t.
By the manner in which abstraction functions are lifted to sets, they distribute over set union, that is,
View reduction
Given a set of views V 1 , . . . , V n of a system S, it may be possible to "reduce" each view V i based on the information contained in the other views and as a result obtain views V 1 , . . . , V n that are "more accurate" views of S. We use the term reduction inspired from similar work in abstract interpretation [11, 20] .
For example, if we assume that conformance is defined as V ⊇ a(S), then the views V top = {(1, 1), (3, 3)} and V side = {(2, 2), (1, 2)} can be reduced to V top = {(1, 1)} and V side = {(1, 2)}. V top is still a valid top view, in the sense that for every system S, if both V top ⊇ a top (S) and V side ⊇ a side (S), then V top ⊇ a top (S). In addition, V top is more accurate than V top in the sense that V top is a strict subset of V top . Indeed, V top does not contain the "bogus" square (3, 3) which cannot occur in S, as we learn from V side .
Let us now define the notion of view reduction formally. First, given a conformance relation between views and systems, | ⊆ 2 D ×2 U , we define the concretization function c | which, given a view V , returns the set of all systems which V conforms to:
We next lift a | to sets of systems. For this, we will again assume that (2 D , ) forms a lattice, with denoting its greatest lower bound. 2 Then, if S is a set of systems over U, we define a | (S) to be the "most accurate" view that conforms to all systems in S:
Lemma 2.2
The most accurate view that conforms to a set of systems S can also be determined from the individual systems' abstractions:
Proof Let us first show that {a | (S) | S ∈ S} a | (S). We do so by showing that a | (S ) a | (S) for all systems S ∈ S, which implies the above statement. Plugging in the definitions, we get
To finish the proof, we still need to show a | (S) {a | (S) | S ∈ S}. We know that for all systems S: S ∈ c | (a | (S)). Also, by monotonicity, "greater" views conform to "more" systems. Formally, V | S and V V imply
Given the above, and assuming n view domains with corresponding conformance relations, (D 1 , | 1 ) , . . . , (D n , | n ), view reduction can be defined as follows: 
We now turn to the second part of the lemma. Due to
Using this and the definition of reduce i we get:
By the first part of the lemma, we have
The second part of the lemma implies that reduction is idempotent, i.e., for all i:
Orthogonality
In some fortunate cases different aspects of a system are independent of each other. Intuitively, what this means is that each aspect can be defined separately without the need for communication between development teams to avoid inconsistencies.
Formally, we say that view domains D 1 , . . . , D n are orthogonal if all sets of non-empty views V 1 , . . . , V n from these view domains are mutually irreducible, i.e., if reduce i (V 1 , . . . , V n ) = V i for all i = 1, . . . , n. The view domains from our example of 3D objects, capturing projections onto two dimensions, are not orthogonal, as the reduction example involving the domains shows. On the other hand, view domains corresponding to the projection onto individual dimensions would indeed be orthogonal to each other.
Alternatively, orthogonal view domains can be defined by requiring that all sets of non-empty views V 1 , . . . , V n from these domains are consistent w.r.t. =.
The following lemma shows that the two definitions of orthogonal domains are equivalent, if we assume that conformance is defined based on abstraction functions and the superset and equality relations as the partial orders on views. Proof We prove equivalence of (1) and (2) . Equivalence between (1) and (3) can be shown analogously.
Lemma 2.4 Given non
. . , = a n , there must be a witness system S * ⊆ U, such that ∀ j = 1, . . . , n : a j (S * ) = V j . Therefore, we also have: ∀i = 1, . . . , n : V j ⊇ a i (S * ), which means that S * is in the concretization w.r.t. the conformance
is a partial order, it is antisymmetric, therefore,
Note that for this part of the proof we used a generic partial order and did not have to use the assumption that reduction is defined w.r.t. abstraction functions lifted to sets of behaviors and the set-theoretic order ⊇.
(2) → (1) :
As by our assumption V 1 , . . . , V n are mutually irreducible, we have
In the example of 3D objects, with 2D projections, the empty object S = {} is view definable, as it is defined by the empty views. Similarly, all objects S i, j,k = {(i, j, k)} are view definable. Note that a general cube is not view definable, as there are other objects (e.g., a hollow cube) which have the same 2D projections.
Verification and synthesis problems in multi-view modeling
View conformance checking Given (concrete representation of) system S, view V , and a certain conformance relation | , does V conform to S w.r.t. | ?
View synthesis Given system S and abstraction function a, synthesize (concrete representation of) a(S). Alternatively, given S and conformance relation | , construct smallest view 
View consistency checking

View reduction Given views
In the problems defined above, a conformance relation could either be given directly, or as a combination of an abstraction function a and partial order (in the latter case, the conformance relation would be a as defined in Sect. 2.5).
It is worth pointing out that the view conformance checking problem is a special case of the view consistency checking problem. Indeed, let S be a system, V a view, and | a conformance relation. We want to check whether V conforms to S, i.e., whether V | S holds. Let V 1 be V and let V 2 be S. Let | 1 be | and let | 2 be = id , where id is the identity function. That is, | 2 is obtained by using equality as the partial order and identity as the abstraction function. Observe that with this definition, V 2 | 2 S is equivalent to V 2 = id(S), i.e., to
therefore, S is a witness to the consistency of V 1 and V 2 . Conversely, if there exists a witness to the consistency of V 1 and V 2 , this witness must be S, in order for V 2 | 2 S to hold, which implies V 1 | 1 S, i.e., V | S.
Our framework as a generalization of the "conjunctive" approach
A natural way to look at multi-view modeling is to say that a view is simply a partial specification of the system in question. Then, the complete specification of the system is taken by composing the partial specifications, typically using a logical conjunction, or set-theoretic intersection, as the composition operator. As discussed in Sect. 5, several existing frameworks in the literature adopt this viewpoint.
Here we show that our framework can express this "conjunctive" MVM approach as a special case. However, our framework can also express more than that and in that sense it can be seen as a generalization of the conjunctive approaches. To see why, consider the set of all behaviors U, and let S 1 , . . . , S n be a set of partial specifications. Semantically, each S i is a set of behaviors, that is, S i ⊆ U for all i = 1, . . . , n. (Syntactically, these partial specifications may be expressed in various languages, but their syntactic representations are not important for our present discussion.) Now, the complete system specification is S = n i=1 S i , and by definition, S ⊆ U. We can then say that the set of partial specifications S 1 , . . . , S n is consistent iff their intersection S is non-empty.
The above situation can be captured in our framework as follows. First, let each view domain D i be identical to U, i.e., let D i = U for all i = 1, . . . , n. Next, let all abstraction functions be the identity functions, i.e., for each i = 1, . . . , n, for any σ ∈ U, a i (σ ) = σ . Third, let all partial orders be ⊇, i.e., let i be ⊇ for all i = 1, . . . , n. Finally, let V i = S i , for i = 1, . . . , n. Then, V 1 , . . . , V n are consistent iff there exists witness system S such that S i = V i ⊇ a i (S) = S, i.e., S ⊆ S i , for all i = 1, . . . , n. Now, such an S always exists trivially, by setting S = ∅. In order to avoid such a trivial solution, we may require that S be non-empty, thus defining a variant of the view consistency problem where only non-empty witness systems are allowed. Then, V 1 , . . . , V n are consistent with a non-empty witness system iff n i=1 S i is non-empty, i.e., iff the intersection of the partial specifications is non-empty.
Application of the framework to symbolic discrete systems
In this section we instantiate the abstract view framework proposed in Sect. 2 to a class of discrete systems described in a symbolic manner. We also provide answers to some of the corresponding algorithmic problems. We begin by introducing the model of discrete systems studied in this section.
Symbolic discrete systems
We consider finite-state discrete systems described symbolically. The state space of such a system can be represented by a set of Boolean variables, X , resulting in 2 n potential states, where n = |X | is the size of X . A state s over X is a valuation over X , i.e., a function s : X → B, where B := {0, 1} is the set of Booleans. For convenience, we sometimes consider other finite domains with the understanding that they can be encoded as Booleans. A behavior over X is a finite or infinite sequence of states over X , σ = s 0 s 1 s 2 · · · . U(X ) denotes the set of all possible behaviors over X . Semantically, a discrete system S over X is a set of behaviors over X , i.e., S ⊆ U(X ). For computation, we need a concrete representation of discrete systems. We will start with a simple representation where all system variables are observable. We will then discuss limitations of this representation and consider an extension where the system can also have internal (unobservable) variables in addition to the observable ones.
Fully observable discrete systems
A fully observable discrete system (FOS) is represented concretely by a triple (X , θ, φ). X is the (finite) set of (Boolean) variables. All variables in X are considered observable. θ is a Boolean expression over X , characterizing the set of initial states of the system. Given state s, we write θ(s) to denote the fact that s satisfies θ , i.e., s is an initial state. φ is a Boolean expression over X ∪ X , where X is the set of primed copies of variables in X , X := {x | x ∈ X }, representing the next-state variables, as usual. φ characterizes pairs of states (s, s ), each representing a transition of S, i.e., a move from state s to state s . We write φ(s, s ) to denote that the pair (s, s ) satisfies φ, i.e., that there is a transition from s to s .
A behavior of a system (X , θ, φ) is a finite or infinite sequence of states over 
We sometimes use S = (X , θ, φ) to denote the concrete (syntactic) representation of discrete system S, and S to denote its semantics, i.e., its set of behaviors.
Variable hiding
Projection is a natural operation on systems, which can also serve as a basic abstraction function for views. For the symbolic discrete system setting that we are considering here, we will define projection as variable hiding, 3 and motivate the introduction of internal variables in the concrete representation of discrete systems.
Let s be a state over a set of variables X . Given subset 
Hiding can be lifted to behaviors in the standard way. If
, and S [Y ], respectively.
Non-closure properties
Non-closure under hiding The hiding h Y ( S ) is defined semantically, as a set of behaviors. It is natural to ask whether the syntactic representation of discrete systems is closed under hiding. That is, is it true that for any S = (X , θ, φ),
This is not generally true:
Lemma 3.1 There exists a FOS S = (X , θ, φ), and Y ⊆ X, such that there is no FOS S = (Y , θ , φ ), such that S = h Y ( S ).
Proof Consider the finite-state system S = ({x, y},
The reason is that S needs to count modulo five in order to produce the correct output. But S has only one Boolean variable y.
Nevertheless, as it turns out, we can check whether closure under hiding holds for a given system: see Theorem 3.2 in Sect. 3.2.2.
Non-closure under union Lemma 3.2 Fully observable systems over a set of variables X are not closed under union, i.e., there exist S
Proof Consider as an example S 1 = ({x}, θ 1 = x, φ 1 = x ∧ ¬x ) and S 2 = ({x}, θ 2 = ¬x, φ 1 = ¬x ∧ x ). Both systems allow exactly one transition, from x → true to x → false and vice versa. A system that represents the union of S 1 and S 2 needs to include both transitions. Then, however, it also includes arbitrarily long behaviors alternating between x → true and x → false.
Discrete systems with internal variables
The above non-closure properties motivate us to study, in addition to fully observable discrete systems, a generalization which extends them with a set of internal, unobservable state variables. Most practical modeling languages also allow the construction of models with both internal and observable state variables.
Accordingly, we extend the definition of a discrete system to be in general a tuple (X , Z , θ, φ), where X , Z are disjoint (finite) sets of variables. X models the observable and Z the internal variables. θ is a Boolean expression over X ∪Z , and φ is a Boolean expression over X ∪Z ∪X ∪Z . In such a system, we need to distinguish between behaviors and observable behaviors. A behavior of a system S = (X , Z , θ, φ) is a finite or infinite sequence σ over X ∪ Z , defined as above. The observable behavior corresponding to σ is h X (σ ), which is a behavior over X . From now on, S denotes the set of all behaviors (over X ∪ Z ) of S, and S o denotes the set of observable behaviors (over X ) of S.
Note that we allow Z to be empty. In that case, the system has no internal variables, i.e., it is a FOS. We will continue to represent a FOS by a triple S = (X , θ, φ). A FOS S satisfies S = S o .
Closure properties
We have already shown (Lemma 3.2) that FOS are not closed under union. They are however closed under intersection:
this is the case if and only if
General discrete systems (with internal variables) are closed under intersection, union, as well as hiding.
Lemma 3.4 Let S
1 = (X , Z 1 , θ 1 , φ 1 ) and S 2 = (X , Z 2 , θ 2 , φ 2 ) be two systems, such that Z 1 ∩ Z 2 = ∅. Let Y ⊆ X and let z be a fresh variable not in X ∪ Z 1 ∪ Z 2 . Let: S ∩ = (X , Z 1 ∪ Z 2 , θ 1 ∧ θ 2 , φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ), S ∪ = X , Z 1 ∪ Z 2 ∪ {z}, (θ 1 ∧ z) ∨ (θ 2 ∧ ¬z), (z → φ 1 ∧ z ) ∧ (¬z → φ 2 ∧ ¬z ) , S h = (Y , Z 1 ∪ (X \Y ), θ 1 , φ 1 ). Then, S ∩ o = S 1 o ∩ S 2 o , S ∪ o = S 1 o ∪ S 2 o , and S h o = h Y ( S 1 o ).
Views of finite-state symbolic discrete systems
Having defined discrete systems, we now turn to instantiating the view framework for such systems.
Discrete views, view domains, and abstraction functions
Discrete views are finite-state discrete systems. They are represented in general by tuples of the form (X , Z , θ, φ), and when Z = ∅, by triples of the form (X , θ, φ).
In this paper, we will study hiding as the abstraction function for the discrete view framework. That is, a system will be a discrete system S over a set of observable variables X , and therefore the domain of system behaviors will be U = U(X ). A view will be a discrete system V over a subset of observable variables Y ⊆ X . Therefore, the view domain of V is D = U(Y ). Note that both S and V may have (each their own) internal variables.
Let S = (X , Z , θ, φ) be a discrete system, V = (Y , W , θ , φ ) be a discrete view, with Y ⊆ X , and be one of the orders =, ⊆, or ⊇. To make notation lighter, we will write
More generally, when comparing systems or views, we compare them w.r.t. their observable behaviors. For instance, when writing V 1 V 2 , we mean
Least and greatest fully observable views
Let S be a discrete system over a set of observable variables X . Given a subset of variables Y ⊆ X , one might ask whether there is a "canonical" view V of S w.r.t. Y . Clearly, if we allow V to have internal variables, the answer is yes: it suffices to turn all variables in X \Y into internal variables in V . Then, by Lemma 3.4, V is a complete view, i.e.,
it satisfies V = h Y (S), and therefore trivially also V ⊇ h Y (S) and V ⊆ h Y (S).
Note that this is true independently of whether S has internal variables or not.
In this section we study the question for the case where we forbid V from having internal variables, i.e., we restrict views to be fully observable. As FOS are not closed under hiding, there are systems that have no complete fully observable view. On the other hand, there can be multiple views 
is the unique fully observable least view lv(S, Y ), that is, lv(S, Y ) ⊇ h Y (S), and for any fully observable view V over Y with V ⊇ h Y (S), we have V ⊇ lv(S, Y ).
As Lemma 3.1 shows, the hiding of a system cannot generally be represented as a fully observable view. As it turns out, we can effectively check whether this is the case for a given system S, by checking whether the least view of S conforms to S w.r.t. =.
Theorem 3.2 Given discrete system S over X and Y ⊆ X, there exists a fully observable view V over Y with V
The least view lv(S, Y ) can be computed as shown in Theorem 3.
Given lv(S, Y ) it is sufficient to check whether lv(S, Y ) ⊆ h Y (S)
. This is shown to be decidable in Theorem 3.4 in the following section. Theorem 3.2 implies that it is decidable to check whether a system admits a fully observable complete view V .
Theorem 3.3 There is a discrete system S over X and a subset Y ⊆ X for which there is no unique greatest fully observable view gv(S, Y ) with gv(S, Y ) ⊆ h Y (S), such that for any fully observable view V with V ⊆ h Y (S), we have V ⊆ gv(S, Y ).
Proof Consider the FOS
The FOS S 1 and S 2 from the proof of Lemma 3.2 are both views of S for Y = {x}, yet they are incomparable and there is no FOS view conforming to S w.r.t. ⊆ that is greater than both of them as their union is not a view of S.
View conformance checking for discrete systems and views
, where Y ⊆ X and Z ∩ W = ∅, and partial order ∈ {=, ⊆, ⊇}, check whether V h Y (S). Proof For the first part of the theorem, observe that discrete systems are closed under hiding. An instance of Problem 3.1 can be transformed into an instance of Problem 3.2, simply by shifting the variables X \Y of S from the observable to the internal variables.
Problem 3.2 Given discrete systems S
For the second part of the theorem, we limit our attention to the case =⊆, as the other two cases then follow trivially. Problem 3.2 can be reduced to the non-deterministic finite-state automaton (NFA) inequivalence problem, which is known to be in PSPACE [18] . As discrete systems are closed under union, we construct a system S ∪ , with 
View consistency checking for discrete systems and views
Problem 3.3 Given partial order ∈ {=, ⊆, ⊇} and discrete views
Problem 3.3 asks to check whether a given number of views are consistent w.r.t. hiding as abstraction function and a given partial order among =, ⊆, ⊇. Note that we can assume without loss of generality that the witness system has set of observable variables X = n i=1 Y i , as any extra variables could be made internal. Problem 3.3 is trivially solved by the "all" system θ = φ = true for ⊆ and by the "empty" system θ = φ = false for ⊇. For =, if we restrict the witness system to be a FOS, then Problem 3.3 is trivially decidable as there are only finitely many systems with X = n i=1 Y i . Clearly, this is not very efficient. Theorems 3.7-3.9 (which also apply to general discrete systems, non-necessarily FOS) provide a non-bruteforce method.
Theorem 3.7 For a set of views V
is the unique greatest witness system for V i for systems with the set of variables X , i.e.,
Given two views V i , V j , the unique greatest witness system for both views is 
is the unique greatest witness system for the set of views V 1 , . . . , V n .
Theorem 3.8 Consistency with respect to = holds if and only if the greatest witness system gw
7 is a witness with respect to =.
Proof Clearly, if gw(V 1 , . . . , V n ) is a witness for =, then consistency with = holds. So, assume, gw(V 1 , . . . , V n ) is no witness for =. We need to show that no witness for = exists, i.e., that consistency with = does not hold. Assume for a contradiction S is a witness for =. As gw(V 1 , . . . , V n ) is no witness for = but S is, there must be a V i , such that
Thus, S is also a witness for ⊇, contradicting the assumption that gw(V 1 , . . . , V n ) is the greatest such witness.
Theorem 3.9 Problem 3.3 is PSPACE-complete for partial order =.
Proof Checking consistency is in PSPACE, because it reduces to checking conformance of the greatest witness system with all of the views, which is shown to be decidable in PSPACE in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
For the PSPACE-hardness, we reduce conformance checking, shown to be PSPACE-hard in Theorem 3.6, to consistency checking: 
S is a witness system for consistency of V and S w.r.t. =, as h X ( S o ) = S o . For the other direction, assume S = (X , Z , θ , φ ) is a witness system for consistency of V and S w.r.t.
, S is also a witness for consistency. 
Proof Consider the following two views V x = ({x}, θ x = x, φ x = true) and V y = ({y}, θ y = y, φ y = true). We provide two witness systems S 1 , S 2 , both consistent with V x , V y , such that their intersection is not consistent with V x and V y , which proves that there is no unique least witness system for V x , V y w.r.t. ⊆:
In every behavior of S 1 , x and y take the same value, whereas in S 2 , x and y are never both false. In their intersection S ∩ = ({x, y}, θ 1 ∧ θ 2 , φ 1 ∧ φ 2 ), neither x nor y can thus ever be false. So S ∩ is neither consistent with V x nor with V y .
View reduction for discrete systems and views
Problem 3.4 Given partial order ∈ {=, ⊆, ⊇} and discrete views V 1 , . . . , V n , with 
Proof Observe that hiding is distributive, i.e., h Y (
(This follows from the fact that hiding is a function defined over behaviors and lifted to sets in the standard way.)
For partial order ⊆, Problem 3.4 is often trivial. Specifically, if the sets of observable variables of all views are incomparable, then no information can be transferred from one view to another:
Then, assuming is ⊆, the following holds for all i:
Proof From Lemma 2.3 we know that the set of witnesses to the consistency of views V 1 , . . . , V n is invariant under reduction, i.e., for all i,
In the same lemma, reduce i is also shown to be reductive. For partial order =⊆ this means that reduce i (V 1 , . . . , V n ) ⊇ V i . We show that in the setting considered here, reduce i (V 1 , . . . , V n ) V i would violate the invariance property of reduction mentioned above, which then immediately implies the theorem.
So for a contradiction, assume for some i there is a behavior σ = s 1 s 2 . . . ∈ reduce i (V 1 , . . . , V n )\V i . We will construct a system S that is a witness to the consistency of
So S is not a witness to the consistency of reduce 1 
S is constructed as the union of witness systems S i for V i and S j for each V j , j = i as follows:
as the initial state of S j is only constrained on variables that are irrelevant to V j . By monotonicity of hiding, this implies
by our initial assumption, and σ / ∈ h Y i (S j ) for all j = i by construction.
Application of the framework to languages and automata
In this section we provide a second instantiation of the abstract view framework proposed in Sect. 2, this time for the case of languages and automata over finite and infinite words.
Languages, automata, projections, and inverse projections
We begin by recalling background material on languages and automata over finite and infinite words. We also provide a set of results on projections and inverse projections related to these objects. We will use those results when instantiating our view framework, in Sect. 4.2.
Background: languages and automata over finite and infinite words
Languages of finite and infinite words Let be a finite set (the alphabet). * denotes the set of all finite words (sequences) over . The empty word is denoted . + denotes the set * \{ }. ω denotes the set of all infinite words over . We use ∞ as a shorthand for * ∪ ω . A language L on is a set of words in * or ω , i.e., L ⊆ ∞ . A * -language (star-language) is a subset of * . An ω-language is a subset of ω .
Finite automata A deterministic finite automaton (DFA) M is a tuple (Q, , δ, q 0 , F) where Q is a finite set of states, is a finite alphabet, δ : Q × → Q is a transition function (assumed to be total), q 0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and F ⊆ Q is a set of final states. M accepts a finite word w = a 0 · a 1 · · · a n−1 if there is a sequence of states r 0 , r 1 · · · r n ∈ Q, such that: (1) r 0 = q 0 , (2) for every i ∈ [0, n −1], δ(r i , a i ) = r i+1 , and (3) r n ∈ F. The language of M, denoted L(M), is the set of finite words that M accepts.
A non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA) M is a tuple (Q, , , Q 0 , F), such that Q, , and F are as in a DFA, Q 0 ⊆ Q is a set of initial states, and ⊆ Q × ( ∪ { }) × Q is the transition relation. Note that we allow NFA withtransitions: is the empty word which is absorbed during word concatenation, as usual. It is well known that NFA and DFA are equivalent, in the sense that a NFA can be transformed to a DFA that accepts the same language.
A language L is called regular if there is a DFA M such that L(M) = L. By definition, a regular language is a language containing only finite words.
DFA product Let M 1 and M 2 be two DFA (Q 1 , , δ 1 , q 0,1 , F 1 )  and (Q 2 , , δ 2 , q 0,2 , F 2 ) . The product of M 1 and M 2 , denoted M 1 ×M 2 , is the DFA (Q 1 ×Q 2 , , δ, (q 0,1 , q 0,2 ) , q 1 , a), δ 2 (q 2 , a) ). , q 2 , i), a, (q 1 , q 2 , j) ) ∈ if and only if (q 1 , a, q 1 ) ∈ 1 , (q 2 , a, q 2 ) ∈ 2 , and i = j, or i = 1 and j = 2 and s 1 ∈ F 1 , or i = 2 and j = 1 and s 2 ∈ F 2 .
Büchi automata
NBA product Let
The following are known results from the literature:
Projections and inverse projections on words and languages
The abstraction functions we use for views of languages are projections of words and languages. These projections remove from a word all letters not belonging in a given alphabet. In this subsection, we define these projection functions and state general results about them.
Word projection Let be an alphabet and let ⊆ . We define the projection function on finite or infinite words as the function
if w = a · w p and a / ∈ Projection from to removes letters not in . Thus, if = {a, b} and = {a}, then
As the last example shows, an infinite word can be turned into a finite word after projection. A finite word remains finite after projection.
Projection of languages
The projection of a * -language is always a * -language. The projection of an ω-language is a language, but not necessarily an ω-language, since after projection an infinite word may become a finite word.
Inverse projection Let L be a language on alphabet , and let ⊇ . The inverse projection of L to is defined as
The inverse projection of an ω-language is necessarily an ω-language, since the inverse projection cannot contain finite words. On the other hand, the inverse projection of a * -language may contain both finite and infinite words.
The following lemma states several properties of projection and inverse projection which we use in proving the results of this section. Omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.1 1. Projection and inverse projection are monotonic: for languages L, L and alphabets
1 , 2 of the appropriate type, if L ⊆ L , then 1 → 2 (L) ⊆ 1 → 2 (L ) and −1 2 ← 1 (L) ⊆ −1 2 ← 1 (L ). 2. Projection distributes over union: if L 1 , L 2 are lan- guages over , and ⊆ , then → (L 1 ∪ L 2 ) = → (L 1 ) ∪ → (L 2 ).
Projection does not generally distribute over intersection, but always yields a subset:
languages over , and 
Inverse projection distributes also over intersection:
−1 ← (L 1 ∩ L 2 ) = −1 ← (L 1 ) ∩ −1 ← (L 2∈ ∞ 1 , 2 → 3 ( 1 → 2 (w)) = 1 → 3 (w). Also, for any L ⊆ ∞ 3 , −1 1 ← 2 ( −1 2 ← 3 (L)) = −1 1 ← 3 (L).
Let , T be two alphabets and let u
∈ ( ∪ T) ∞ be a word over ∪ T. Then → ∩T ( ∪T→ (u)) = T→ ∩T ( ∪T→T (u)∩ 2 = 2 ∩ 3 = 1 ∩ 3 = ∅. If w ∈ ( 1 ∪ 2 ) ∞ , w ∈ ( 2 ∪ 3 ) ∞ ,and1 ∪ 2 → 2 (w) = 2 ∪ 3 → 2 (w ), then there is s ∈ ( 1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 ) ∞ such that 1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 → 1 ∪ 2 (s) = w and 1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 → 2 ∪ 3 (s) = w .
Let L be a language on
and let T be another alphabet. Then,
Note that Parts 6 and 7 of Lemma 4.1 imply that for
) forms a Galois insertion [11] .
DFA projection
Suppose we have a DFA M on alphabet , and we want to
⊆ . This is easy to do, as it suffices to replace any letter not in by , in each transition of M. The resulting automaton is generally non-deterministic, but can be determinized using standard techniques. Formally, let M = (Q, , δ, q 0 , F) be a DFA on and ⊆ . We write → (M) for an NFA (Q, , , {q 0 }, F) withtransitions such that = {(q, a, q ) | a ∈ and δ(q, a) = q } ∪ {(q, , q ) | a ∈ \ and δ(q, a) = q }.
Theorem 4.2 If M is a DFA and ⊆ , then L(
→ (M)) = → (L(M)).
DFA inverse projections
Next, we would like to compute an automaton that recognizes the inverse projection of a regular language. As noted earlier, the inverse projection of a * -language is not necessarily a * -language, since it may contain infinite words (which become finite after the forward projection). Therefore, for the inverse projection of a regular language, we compute two automata: a DFA recognizing the * -part of the inverse projection and an NBA recognizing the ω-part.
DFA finite inverse projection Let M be a DFA (Q, , δ, q 0 , F) and an alphabet such that ⊇ . The finite inverse projection of M on , denoted
, is a DFA M = (Q, , δ , q 0 , F) such that δ is defined as follows: for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ , δ (q, a) = δ(q, a), and for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ \ , δ (q, a) = q. Intuitively, to construct , denoted
contains every transition in δ (i.e., for every q, q ∈ Q and a ∈ , if q = δ(q, a) then (q, a, q ) ∈ ), and in addition, contains the following transitions:
• for every q ∈ Q and a ∈ \ , (q, a, q) ∈ • for every q ∈ F and a ∈ \ , (q, a, q ω ) ∈ • for every a ∈ \ , (q ω , a, q ω ) ∈ .
Intuitively, to construct −1,ω ← (M), we add self-loops to states of M with the new letters in \ , as in the construction of the finite inverse projection of DFA. But in addition, here we add non-deterministic transitions with these new letters from the accepting states of M to the new state q ω , which is the only accepting state of the NBA. We also add self-loops with the new letters to this state. In the end, −1,ω ← (M) has one more state than M, and at most 2 · k · n more transitions, where n is the number of states of M, and k is the number of new letters, in \ . Figure 5a shows a DFA M on alphabet = {a}. M accepts all words in * that contain an odd number of a's. 
Theorem 4.3 If M is a DFA on and
⊇ , then L( −1, * ← (M)) = −1 ← (L(M))∩ * and L( −1,ω ← (M)) = −1 ← (L(M)) ∩ ω .
NBA projections
As noted earlier, the forward projection of an ω-language is not necessarily an ω-language, since some infinite words may be turned into finite ones. For this reason, we define two kinds of (forward) NBA projection: the NBA finite projection which results in an NFA accepting the finite words resulting from the projection; and the NBA infinite projection which results in an NBA accepting the infinite words resulting from the projection. Clearly, then, the language resulting 
where + denotes the transitive closure of . The representation of the finite projection of an NBA M does not require more space than M. Computing takes linear time in the number of edges of M. Computing the set of final states F requires calculating the transitive closure of the subset of with transitions from \ . This can be done in polynomial time using, for example, the Floyd-Warshall algorithm.
An illustration of the NBA finite projection operation is given in Fig. 6 . Figure 6a shows an NBA M over alphabet {a, b}. Figure 6b shows the NFA obtained by the finite projection of M onto alphabet {a} (i.e., removing letter b). Notice that this NFA correctly accepts the language a + . Figure 6c shows the NFA obtained by the finite projection of M onto alphabet {b} (i.e., removing letter a). This NFA has no final states, and therefore its language is empty. This is correct, because every word accepted by M contains an infinite number of b's. Therefore, the projection of every such word onto {b} is infinite. Thus the finite projection contains no words.
NBA infinite projection Let
and there is w ∈ * such that:
where * denotes the reflexive transitive closure of . can be constructed from in polynomial time in the same way that transitions can be removed from NFA. If q ∈ Q, let closur e(q) be the set of states in Q that are reachable from q only by following transitions with letters in \ . This can be computed in polynomial time. Then, (q 1 , a, q 2 ) ∈ if and only if a ∈ and there is q 1 , q 2 ∈ Q such that (q 1 , a, q 2 ) ∈ and q 1 ∈ closure(q 1 ) and q 2 ∈ closure(q 2 ). It is straightforward to implement the latter in polynomial time. As a conclusion, ω → (M) can be constructed from M in polynomial time. An illustration of the NBA infinite projection operation is given in Fig. 7 .
Theorem 4.4 If M is an NBA on and
⊆ , then L( * → (M)) = → (L(M))∩ * and L( ω → (M)) = → (L(M)) ∩ ω .
NBA inverse projection
We now define the inverse projection of an NBA M on alphabet to some alphabet ⊇ . The goal is to construct an
Note that, since both L(M) and L(M ) will contain only infinite words (because both M and M are NBA), L(M ) must be such that its projection will not generate any finite words. Our first attempt is to follow the same approach as with DFA, i.e., introduce self-loops at every state of M, for each extra symbol in . Unfortunately, this "naive" approach does not work, as we next illustrate by example.
Consider the NBA M on alphabet = {a}, shown in Fig. 8a . Let = {a, b}. If we follow the self-loop approach, we get the NBA M shown in Fig. 8b . The language of M is a ω and that of M is (a + b) ω . The projection of (a + b) ω on {a} is a * + a ω which is different from a ω . Hence, the self-loop approach does not work in the case of NBA.
The self-loop in state q on b allows any word to be completed with a suffix b ω and thus adds words in the language of the automaton that will be finite when b is projected out. 
The extra space required to represent the inverse projection of an NBA M is polynomial in the number of edges and states of M and the number of extra symbols in . Each of the four extra sets of transitions in can be computed by enumerating edges and states and extra symbols in , and, thus, computing also takes polynomial time in those.
Theorem 4.5 If M is an NBA on and ⊇ , then L(
−1 ← (M)) = −1 ← (L(M)).
Views of languages and automata
Let us now instantiate the view framework proposed in Sect. 2, to the case of languages and automata on finite or infinite words. In Sects. 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, we provide general results without making assumptions on the type of languages we are dealing with (i.e., whether they are regular or ω-regular). Then, in Sects. 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, we study decision problems for regular and ω-regular languages, respectively.
In the rest of this section, let us fix an alphabet for the system. Then, the domain of system behaviors is U = ∞ = * ∪ ω , and a system is a language over . A view domain is defined for a given i ⊆ . The corresponding view domain is
A view over D i will then be a language over i , i.e., some L i ⊆ ∞ i . We will again use =, ⊆, or ⊇, on languages (i.e., sets) as conformance relations, and projections from to i 's as the abstraction functions. We remark that view consistency w.r.t. ⊆ and ⊇ is trivial. Specifically, two views L 1 ⊆ ∞ 1 and L 2 ⊆ ∞ 2 are always consistent w.r.t. ⊆, meaning there always exists language L on some
Indeed, it suffices to take L := ∅ and the containment → i (L) ⊆ L i holds trivially, since the projection of an empty set is empty. Similarly, L 1 and L 2 are always consistent w.r.t. ⊇, as it suffices to take L := ∞ as the witness. Then,
In the sequel, we focus on consistency w.r.t. =, which is non-trivial.
Necessary and sufficient conditions for view consistency on languages
Language consistency w.r.t. equality Given the setting introduced at the beginning of Sect. 4.2, two languages L 1 and L 2 on 1 and 2 , respectively, are consistent w.r.t. = if there is a language L on such that
We may wonder what happens if is not fixed, but unknown, the only constraint being that is a superset of (but not necessarily equal to) 1 ∪ 2 . As Part 1 of the following theorem shows, it is actually sufficient to look at witness languages over = 1 ∪ 2 . Part 2 of the same theorem shows that the witness to the consistency of two * -languages (resp., ω-languages) is a * -language (resp., ω-language), provided no redundant letters are added to the alphabet of the witness. Finally, Parts 3 and 4 of the theorem provide an important characterization of consistency and a canonical candidate witness. 
Moreover, L is the greatest such witness, that is, any other witness L is such that L ⊆ L .
Part 4 of Theorem 4.6 shows that L is the "canonical" greatest witness to the consistency of L 1 and L 2 . We remark that the way L is defined guarantees that
, which implies that L is a witness to consistency.
The following theorem offers another characterization of consistency. It shows that two languages are consistent if and only if their "non-orthogonal" parts agree. 
. Theorems 4.6 and 4.7 provide necessary and sufficient conditions for view consistency in the language setting. We will exploit these conditions in Sects. 4.2.3 and 4.2.4, to provide algorithmic solutions to the view consistency problem for regular and ω-regular languages.
View reduction for languages
The following result provides a characterization of view reduction for languages w.r.t. ⊇ (Part 1), which can be used as another necessary and sufficient condition for consistency w.r.t. equality (Part 2). 
and
L 1 and L 2 are consistent w.r.t. = if and only if L
1 ⊆ 1 ∪ 2 → 1 ( −1 1 ∪ 2 ← 2 (L 2 )) and L 2 ⊆ 1 ∪ 2 → 2 ( −1 1 ∪ 2 ← 1 (L 1 )).
Solving consistency problems on regular languages
The necessary and sufficient conditions of Theorems 4.6 and 4.7 can be exploited to provide algorithmic solutions to consistency problems for regular languages, i.e., languages accepted by finite automata. We define two slightly different variants of the consistency problem in this case:
Problem 4.1 Given two DFA M 1 and M 2 on alphabets 1 and 2 , respectively, check whether L(M 1 ) and L(M 2 ) are consistent, i.e., whether there exists language L on some alphabet
Problem 4.2 Given two DFA M 1 and M 2 on alphabets 1 and 2 , respectively, check whether there exists DFA M on some alphabet
Note that the two problems are different. Although in both problems the languages for which we want to check consistency are regular, and therefore can be represented as DFA, Problem 4.1 asks for an arbitrary witness language L (not necessarily regular), whereas Problem 4.2 asks whether a regular witness exists. Clearly, if a regular witness exists, then a witness exists. In Theorem 4.9 that follows, we show that the converse also holds. Therefore, the two problems are equivalent. 
where
are the inverse projection constructions for DFA given in Sect. 4.1.4. By Part 2 of Theorem 4.6, and the fact that L(M 1 ) and L(M 2 ) are both * -languages, we deduce that L is a * -language. Therefore, the ω-language components of the inverse projections can be ignored, and L = L(
). By Theorem 4.1, intersection of regular languages is the language of the product of the corresponding DFA, so we get L = L(M ), where M is the product DFA 4 : [18] . Therefore, checking
The construction above relies on the necessary and sufficient condition for consistency given in Theorem 4.6. An alternative construction, albeit with the same PSPACE complexity, can be derived from the necessary and sufficient condition for consistency given in Theorem 4.7. According to the latter,
). This is an instance of the language equivalence problem for NFA, which is PSPACE-complete [18] .
Comparing the two alternative constructions provided above, we note that while both have the same overall complexity, the former construction involves finite inverse projection of DFA, followed by DFA product, forward DFA projections, and language containment between DFA and NFA, while the latter construction involves forward DFA projections, followed by equivalence of NFA. One advantage of the former construction is that it provides a witness regular language L as the language of the DFA M . It is unclear how to use the latter construction to obtain a witness.
PSPACE-hardness: we show that NFA language equivalence is polynomially reducible to Problem 4.1. The result follows from PSPACE-hardness of NFA language equivalence [18] .
Let 
Letters of the form a q,a,q are "fresh" letters not in . Let δ 1 be a function from Q 1 × 1 → Q 1 such that: for q ∈ Q 1 : δ 1 (q, a q,a,q ) = q a,q ; for a ∈ : δ 1 (q a,q , a) = q ; and δ 1 (q, a) = q sink in all other cases.
Let M 1 be the DFA (Q 1 , 1 , δ 1 , q 0,1 , F 1 ) .
It is easy to see that
. We define M 2 similarly. Note that, by the assumption that
We now show that
Although Problems 4.1 and 4.2 are formulated as decision problems, as the proof of Theorem 4.9 shows, we can also solve the corresponding problems of system synthesis from views. Also note that if the inputs to Problem 4.2 were NFA instead of DFA, the complexity of the problem would not change: it is easy to see that two NFA M 1 and M 2 on are equivalent if any only if M 1 and M 2 are consistent.
Solving consistency problems on ω-regular languages
We now turn our attention to view consistency for ω-regular languages. As in the case of regular languages, we define two slightly different variants of the problem. In both problems the languages for which we want to check consistency are ω-regular and represented as NBA. But while Problem 4.3 asks for an arbitrary witness language L, Problem 4.4 asks for an ω-regular witness. Clearly, if an ω-regular witness exists, then a witness exists. In Theorem 4.10 that follows, we prove that the converse also holds.
Problem 4.3
Given two NBA N 1 and N 2 on alphabets 1 and 2 , respectively, check whether L(N 1 ) and L(N 2 ) are consistent, i.e., whether there exists language L on some alphabet
Problem 4.4 Given two NBA N 1 and N 2 on alphabets 1 and 2 , respectively, check whether there exists NBA N on some alphabet 
) is a witness to the consistency of L (N 1 ) and L(N 2 ) . By Theorem 4.5,
. By Theorem 4.1, intersection of ω-regular languages is the language of the product of the corresponding NBA, so we get L = L(N ), where N is the product NBA: 
(N ) and
(N ) are the two forward projection constructions for NBA given in Sect. 4.1.5. Note, however, that, by definition,
. This, and the fact that L(N i ) contains only infinite words, implies that
is an instance of the problem of checking language containment between two NBA. Language containment between two NBA N = (Q, , , Q 0 , F) and N = (Q , , , Q 0 , F ) can be decided in PSPACE, as it can be reduced to language equivalence between two NBA, which is PSPACE-complete [43] : The construction above relies on the necessary and sufficient condition for consistency given in Theorem 4.6. An alternative construction, albeit with the same PSPACE complexity, can be derived from the necessary and sufficient condition for consistency given in Theorem 4.7. According to the latter, N 2 ) ). By Theorem 4.4 and the fact that a * -language and an ω-language are always disjoint, the latter condition holds iff both (a) L(
(N i ) is the NFA obtained by the finite projection construction from NBA N i , while in (b),
is the NBA obtained by the infinite projection construction from NBA N i . Therefore, (a) is an instance of the language equivalence problem for NFA, while (b) is an instance of the language equivalence problem for NBA. Both these problems are PSPACE-complete [18, 43] .
Comparing the two alternative constructions provided above, we note that while both have the same overall complexity, the former construction involves inverse projection of NBA, followed by NBA product, forward NBA infinite projection, and NBA language containment, while the latter construction involves forward NBA projections, followed by equivalence of NFA and NBA. One advantage of the former construction is that it provides a witness ω-regular language L as the language of the NBA N . It is unclear how to use the latter construction to obtain a witness.
PSPACE-hardness We will reduce NBA language equivalence to Problem 4.3. The result follows from the fact that NBA language equivalence is PSPACE-complete [43] and therefore also PSPACE-hard.
Let N 1 and N 2 be two NBA, both on the same alphabet .
Although Problems 4.3 and 4.4 are formulated as decision problems, as the proof of Theorem 4.10 shows, we can also solve the corresponding system synthesis from views problems.
Related work
MVM is not a new topic, and terms such as "view" and "viewpoint" often appear in system engineering literature, including standards such as ISO 42010 [25] . Despite this fact, and the fact that MVM is a crucial concern in system design, an accepted mathematical framework for reasoning about views has so far been lacking. This is especially true for behavioral views, that is, views describing the dynamic behavior of the system, as opposed to its static structure. Behavioral views are the main focus of our work.
Behavioral abstractions/views are also the topic of [38, 39] . Their framework is close to ours, in the sense that it also uses abstraction functions to map behaviors between different levels of abstraction (or between systems and views). The focus of both [38, 39] is to ease the verification task in a heterogeneous (e.g., both discrete and continuous) setting. Our main focus is checking view consistency. The notion of "heterogeneous consistency" [38] is different from our notion of view consistency. The notion of "conjunctive implication" [38] is also different, as views which have an empty intersection of their inverse projections trivially satisfy conjunctive implication, yet these views can be inconsistent in our framework. Problems such as view consistency checking are not considered in [38, 39] .
Discrete behavioral views could also be captured in a temporal logic formalism such as LTL. Suppose two views are described as LTL formulas φ 1 and φ 2 (possibly over a different set of variables). View consistency could then be defined as satisfiability of the conjunction φ 1 ∧ φ 2 . This definition corresponds to the conjunctive approach discussed in Sect. 2.11 and is weaker than consistency w.r.t. =. Satisfiability of φ 1 ∧φ 2 is equivalent to checking that the intersection of the inverse projections of views is non-empty. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for consistency w.r.t. = , as explained in Sect. 2.7.
The same fundamental difference exists between our framework and view consistency as formulated in the context of interface theories, where a special type of interface conjunction is used [22] (called "fusion" in [4] and "shared refinement" in [14, 46] ). This can be seen by taking, for simplicity, the refinement relation to be set containment. Then, consistency of two views V 1 and V 2 could be defined as the existence of some (non-empty) S that refines both V 1 and V 2 , i.e., such that S ⊆ V 1 and S ⊆ V 2 . This reduces to checking whether the intersection V 1 ∩ V 2 is nonempty, and is similar to satisfiability of φ 1 ∧ φ 2 discussed above.
For similar reasons, our framework is different from the multi-paradigm specification framework of [49] , where partial specifications written in different languages are given semantics in a common domain of predicate logic, and then composed by logical conjunction.
An interesting question is how our framework deals with feature interaction. It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer this question thoroughly. Nevertheless, let us make the following remarks. According to Zave, "a feature interaction arises when the feature-by-feature specification of a system is incomplete, ambiguous, or incorrect" [48] . To manage the feature interaction problem, the distributed feature composition framework (DFC) is introduced in [29] . A feature in DFC is essentially a component (a box in the terminology of [29] ), and DFC allows components to be composed in various configurations similar to dataflow or block diagrams. We regard views as different from components, in the sense that components interact via their interfaces, but do not overlap like views do. Therefore, components represent the various subsystems of a system which are clearly separated (non-overlapping). Views on the other hand are not subsystems, but overlapping aspects of the same system. In that sense, our framework is different from DFC, as well as from other component-based frameworks (e.g., see [45] ).
Motivated by similar applications as those treated in DFC, model management operations Match and Merge are developed for Statecharts in [34] . Model merging in a state machine setting is further studied in [42] , where a behavioral merge algorithm is proposed, "motivated by the need to preserve the behavioural properties of a set of state machines in their merges." Although "the merge is defined as a common refinement of a set of state machines," the authors also assume "that any disagreements between stakeholders have already been resolved, and as such, all remaining discrepancies between the behaviors of the input models are treated as variabilities in the models' intended functionality," which seems to preclude inconsistency detection. It should also be noted that some frameworks aim at a more lenient approach which allows inconsistencies between viewpoints to be tolerated, e.g., see [15] . Other approaches avoid the problem of inconsistency detection and opt for the "easier problem of detection, verification and tracking of ontological overlaps" [44] .
Broy [8] defines a view to be "an abstraction that concentrates on a particular aspect of a software system." Several views for modeling software systems are described in [8, 10] , including interface views, which define the input/output behavior of a system; architectural views, capturing the hierarchical structure of a system; and state views, i.e., state machines. In [10] it is shown how to translate interface views into state views and vice versa, how to translate from architectural views into interface views, and how to related views via common trace semantics, or via a refinement relation. In our work, we propose a metamodel where a priori any kind of view model can be represented, in addition to the interface, architectural, and state models above. This metamodel also allows to explicitly define the notion of view consistency, as well as other notions such as orthogonality and view reduction. Finally, concrete problems of consistency checking such as those studied in Sects. 3 and 4 are not discussed in [8, 10] .
Broy also introduces interaction refinement [9] , which relates components operating in different domains, one on a more abstract level than the other, where two functions, typically forming a Galois insertion, allow to translate input and output histories between the two domains. A component A refines another component B if the behaviors of A translated into the domain of B form a subset of the behaviors of B. Our notion of conformance is more flexible and can be seen as a generalization of the above idea to arbitrary conformance relations (not just ⊆). Also, in the context of interaction refinement, there is no discussion of a single component simultaneously refining multiple components, which would more closely correspond to our notion of consistency.
A multi-view specification framework is proposed in [26] in the context of the formal specification language Z. In that work, a view is a partial specification of a program, consisting of a state space and a set of operations. A full specification is obtained by composing several views, linking them through their states (by asserting invariants across views) and through their operations (by defining combinations of operations from different views).
Multi-view modeling is related to metamodeling, where the syntax and/or semantics of a language is described in a metalanguage. Formal treatments of metamodeling include [27, 28] . In principle, metamodeling techniques could be used to approach MVM problems from a different perspective. For example, rather than relating views via abstraction functions, one could employ model transformations to translate one view to the domain of another view. Then, having two views "living" in the same domain, one could employ traditional equivalence or other checking techniques. Investigating such an approach is left for future work.
Consistency between architectural views, which capture structural but not behavioral aspects of a system, is studied in [5] . Consistency problems are also studied in [17] using a static, logic-based framework. A similar in spirit approach is followed in [23] , which states: "We investigate the hypothesis that all models can be represented by graphs and that inconsistencies can be identified by means of pattern matching." In contrast, we follow a semantic approach which focuses on the behaviors generated by the models and not on the syntax of those models (which could be graphs, text, etc.). Procedures such as join and normalization in relational databases also relate to notions of static consistency.
An extensive survey of different approaches for multiview modeling can be found in [35] . [35] also gives a partial and preliminary formalization, but does not discuss algorithmic problems. [7] discusses an informal methodology for selecting formalisms, languages, and tools based on viewpoint considerations. Surveys of trends in multi-paradigm modeling can be found in [2, 3] . Trends and visions in multiview modeling are also the topic of [47] . The latter paper also discusses pragmatics of MVM in the context of the Ptolemy tool. However, formal aspects of MVM and algorithmic problems such as checking consistency are not discussed.
Implicitly, MVM is supported by multi-modeling languages such as UML, SysML, and AADL. For instance, AADL defines separate "behavior" and "error annexes." Having separate models in these annexes can result in inconsistencies. Architectural consistency notions in a UMLlike framework are studied in [13] . There is a large body of work studying various notions of consistency between different UML diagrams. Maoz et al. [32] study consistency between an object diagram and a class diagram. In a follow-up work, the authors consider verifying component and connector models against structural views [33] . Egyed et al. [16] describe an automatic method for generating changes for fixing inconsistencies in UML models. Blanc et al. [6] present methods to detect structural inconsistencies between models represented by sequences of elementary construction operations, and where consistency rules are expressed as logical constraints on such sequences. Grundy et al. [21] present an integrated environment for managing various types of inconsistencies, based on change propagation and response graphs. Diethers et al. [12] present the tool Vooduu which checks consistency between UML Statecharts and sequence diagrams, by translating these models into the model of timed automata [1] . Zhao et al. [50] check consistency between sequence diagrams and Statecharts using the SPIN model checker [24] . Lucas et al. [31] review the literature about UML model consistency management. They broadly categorize consistency problems as (a) either syntactic or semantic and either (b) horizontal or vertical. Our framework concerns semantic consistency problems. In our setting, horizontal consistency corresponds to view consistency between views with incomparable (but not necessarily disjoint) alphabets, whereas vertical consistency corresponds to the case where one model's set of variables is a superset of another model's set of variables.
As an example of work that falls into the semantic, horizontal category, Rasch and Wehrheim [40] define consistency between class diagrams and state machines and show how to check consistency according to this notion using a model checker.
Models are usually not immutable objects, but may evolve over time to reflect design changes. Getir et al. [19] consider the problem of co-evolving multiple views of a system, maintaining consistency. It would be possible to extend our framework to allow for operations that may modify views. Then, a challenge is to find corresponding operations that modify other views to maintain consistency. This problem is related but not equivalent to that of finding best abstract transformers in Abstract Interpretation [11] .
Several of our results on the concrete instances of MVM problems studied in Sects. 3 and 4 rely on the study of different types of projections on languages, automata, and symbolic transition systems. While some of these projection constructions are folk knowledge (e.g., projection of DFA), others appear to be less well known (e.g., inverse projection of Büchi automata, or hiding operations on symbolic discrete systems) and may also constitute original contributions of this work, interesting for their own sake.
This paper is an extended and revised version of the conference paper [41] . Apart from proofs, the most significant addition to [41] is Sect. 4, which is entirely new. Two recent publications that appeared since the submission of this paper are [36, 37] . In [37] , the results of Sect. 4 are further extended for infinitary languages, that is, languages that contain both finite and infinite words. In [36] the abstract framework of Sect. 2 is instantiated to the case of symbolic discrete systems as in Sect. 3, but with a different type of abstraction functions than the projections used in Sect. 3. Specifically, Pittou and Tripakis [36] studies timing abstractions and in particular periodic sampling.
Conclusions and perspectives
This work provides a generic abstract model to reason about views as abstractions of systems. This abstract model allows in particular to define formally concepts such as view consistency, conformance, and orthogonality. To illustrate the applicability of our framework, we instantiated it to the cases of symbolic transition systems, and to languages and automata, and solved the corresponding algorithmic problems arising in those settings. In the process of doing so, we studied various notions of projection and inverse projection for discrete systems and also provided interesting characterizations of view consistency and canonical witnesses to consistency.
Several directions for future work can be envisaged. Although our abstract framework is general enough to capture many types of systems, including discrete, continuous, and hybrid systems, our study of concrete instances of the framework has so far been limited to discrete models. Such models are not sufficient for capturing cyber-physical systems. A natural direction for future research is to study algorithmic problems such as consistency checking in a heterogeneous setting, for instance, where some views are discrete, others continuous, and others hybrid. Another direction is to generalize the view consistency checking techniques of this paper so as to be able to combine all three conformance relations, =, ⊆, ⊇, in an arbitrary manner. Yet a third direction is to investigate other types of abstraction functions than projections. Another direction is to study algorithmic problems related to orthogonality. Finally, it remains part of future work to implement and evaluate this framework experimentally. Developing features to make such an implementation more usable in practice (e.g., methods to provide counterexamples in the case where consistency fails) is also part of future work.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.4
In the former case, h X ∪Z 1 (σ ) is a behavior of S 1 , and thus
To show that ( S 1 o ) . There must be a behavior σ of
Proof of Theorem 3.1
To see that lv(S, Y ) is a view of S for partial order ⊇, consider an arbitrary behavior σ = s 1 . . . s n of S. Then, θ(s 1 ) and for all i = 1, . . . , n − 1, we have ψ S (s i ) and φ(s i , s i+1 ). Proof of Theorem 3.5
φ) if and only if it is a view of the fully observable system S = (X ∪ Z , θ, φ). This is because h Y (S) = h Y (S ).
Thus, in the following, we will assume S to be a FOS with S = (X , θ, φ).
Let ψ S denote the reachable states of S. ψ S can, e.g., be computed incrementally using BDDs. Let Z := X \Y and Z := X \Y . Then, V ⊇ h Y S, if and only if the following two conditions hold, which can be effectively checked:
We need to show that Conditions 1 and 2 from above hold, if and only if V ⊇ h Y S.
Let us first show that Conditions 1 and 2 imply V ⊇ h Y S:
We show this by induction over the length n of behaviors σ of S. Base case: let σ = s 0 ∈ S be any behavior of length 1 of S. Then θ(s 0 ) must hold, which, by Condition 1, implies θ V (h(s 0 )), which implies that h(s 0 ) ∈ V . Induction step: let σ = s 0 s 1 · · · s n−1 s n ∈ S be a sequence of length n + 1. As S is by definition prefixclosed, s 0 s 1 · · · s n−1 is also in S. By the induction hypothesis, we know that h(s 0 )h(s 1 ) · · · h(s n−1 ) is in V . As σ ∈ S, s n−1 is reachable, thus ψ S (s n−1 ) holds. Thus, we can apply Condition 2, and deduce from the fact that 
∈ V , which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.6
In [30] , it is shown that checking the universality of nondeterministic finite automata (NFA), having the property that all states are final, is PSPACE-hard for alphabets of size at least 2.
We reduce this problem in polynomial time to Problem 3.1 for |Y | ≥ 1, V being fully observable, and partial orders = and ⊆. NFAs considered in [30] are quintuples M = (Q, , δ, I , F) , where Q is a finite set of states; is a finite alphabet; δ : Q × → 2 Q is the transition function; δ is naturally extended to sets of states and words; I ⊆ Q is the set of initial states; and F is the set of final states, in this case F = Q. A word w ∈ * is accepted by NFA M, if δ(I , w) ∩ F = ∅. The universality problem is to check whether every word w ∈ * is accepted by a given NFA M, or not.
For a given NFA M = (Q, , δ, I , F), we construct a discrete system S M , such that w = t 1 . . . t n ∈ + is accepted by M if and only if there exists a behavior σ = s 1 Then, the transition relation φ M and the initial states θ M of S M are defined as follows: To check whether S M is "universal," we can construct a fully observable view It remains to show that it is also PSPACE-hard to check whether V ⊇ h Y S if V is not restricted to be fully observable. To see this, we exchange the roles of the view and the system from above, and construct, for a given NFA M, a view V M and a "universal" system S, such that 
, and the result follows. To see why the inclusion is strict, let L 1 = {aab} and L 2 = {aba}. Then the intersection of L 1 and L 2 is empty, but their projection onto alphabet {a} yields the same word, aa.
Proof of Lemma 4.1, Part 4:
. Proof of Lemma 4.1, Part 6:
Proof of Lemma 4.1, Part 7: by definition of 
. Proof of Lemma 4.1, Part 9: by Part 8 of this lemma, we know that
Proof of Lemma 4.1, Part 10: we prove this part of the lemma constructively by defining a function merge such that
Let merge be a function from First, it is easy to see that the conditions for the first four cases are mutually exclusive. Under the assumption that
, if the fifth case applies to merge(w, w , i), then either the first or the second case will apply to merge(w, w , (i + 1)%2) and thus merge is well defined for such inputs.
The latter implies that for every 0 < i < |merge(w, w , 0)|, there are unique x, w p , w p such that |x| = i and merge(w,
. It is easy to show by induction over i that the following are true about w, w , x, w p , w p :
Hence, all finite prefixes of w and
(merge(w, w , 0)) are equal, and so the corresponding words are equal. By the same argument w =
There is w ∈ L(M) such that → (w ) = w. Since w is finite, and w is infinite, there is k such that if w is the suffix of w after its k-th element, then
If R is any accepting run of M on w , then after the k-th step, only transitions in {(q, a, q ) ∈ | a ∈ \ } are taken. Let f be an accepting state that is visited infinitely often in R after the k-th step. Then from the existence of R, there is s ∈ ( \ ) * such that ( f , s, f ) ∈ + and f ∈ F . It is easy to construct an accepting run of * → (M) from R that ends in f , and accepts w.
• We next prove that
There is an accepting run R of M on w that ends in a final state f ∈ F . Assume that after reading symbol a i , run R is at state q i+1 .
We will show that we can extend R in such a way that after reading symbol a i+1 it will be at state q i+2 .
Let and be the transition relations of M and −1 ← (M), respectively. State q i+1 is either accepting or not. We examine the two cases separately.
• In the first case, since b i+1,0 ∈ \ and {(q, a,q) | q ∈ F, a ∈ \ } ⊆ , R can be extended with − −−−− → q i+1 . Last, since {(q, a, q ) | q ∈ F, (q, a, q ) ∈ } ⊆ and (q i+1 , a i+1 , q i+2 ) ∈ , ( q i+1 , a i+1 , q i+2 ) ∈ and R can be extended with:
• In the second case, because by construction {(q, a, q) | q ∈ Q\F, a ∈ \ }, R can be extended with − − → q i+2 . Hence, in this case too, R can be extended in a way that after reading a i+1 it is at state q i+2 .
Therefore R visits the same states as R and is accepting, or w ∈ L( Proof If q i+1 / ∈ F, then for every k such that i < k < j, the only transition from q i+1 on a k is to q i+1 . Therefore, q j = q i+1 and the claim holds.
If q i+1 ∈ F, then q i+2 = q i+1 and for every k such that i + 1 < k < j, the only transition from q i+2 on a k is to q i+2 . Therefore, q j = q i+2 = q i+1 . By construction of , for every q ∈ F and a ∈ , if (q, a, q ) ∈ then (q, a, q ) ∈ . Therefore, (q i+1 , a j , q j+1 ) ∈ . • If a i / ∈ then R i+1 = R i and R i+1 remains a partial run of M.
• If a i ∈ then R i+1 = R i a − → q i+1 . Let j be the largest index smaller than i such that a j ∈ . Hence, the last state in R i is q j+1 and by Lemma A.6 there is a transition from q j+1 to q i+1 on a i .
What remains is to show that R is an accepting run of M. Because R is an accepting run of −1 ← (M), there is an infinite number of i's such that q i ∈ F. By definition of , if (q, a, q ) ∈ and q ∈ F, then a ∈ . By definition of R , whenever q i ∈ F, R i also ends with q i . Hence, R is an accepting run of → (w) and 
Proof of Theorem 4.6
Proof of Theorem 4.6, Part 1: the if direction is trivial.
Only if: assume that L 1 and L 2 are consistent, that is, there exists language L on some alphabet ⊇ 1 ∪ 2 , such that
We will show that L is also a valid witness, that is, we will show that 1 • For Part 2a, assume L is not a * -language, i.e., there is a word w ∈ L ∩ ω . Then, there is at least one letter a ∈ that occurs infinitely often in w. As = 1 ∪ 2 , a is either in 1 or 2 , and so at least one of the words → 1 (w), → 2 (w) is infinite. This contradicts the assumption that L is a witness to the consistency of L 1 and L 2 w.r.t. =, which would imply that
• For Part 2b, it suffices to note that in order for the projection of L to be an ω-language, L must itself contain only infinite words (since the projection of a finite word is a finite word).
Proof of Theorem 4.6, Part 3:
If: we will show that L is a valid witness to the consistency of L 1 , L 2 . For this, it suffices to show that 
By Lemma 4.1, Part 6, 1 ∪ 2 → i ( To show L ⊆ L , we need to prove L ⊆
(L 2 ), and the result follows by definition of L . We have:
by assumption that L is witness
The case L ⊆
(L 2 ) is symmetric. Proof of Theorem 4.6, Part 4: the fact that L is a valid witness to the consistency of L 1 , L 2 is proven above, in the proof of the if direction of Part 3. The fact that L is the greatest witness is also proven above, in the proof of the only if direction of Part 3.
Proof of Theorem 4.7
We first consider the only if direction. Let L be a witness to the consistency of L 1 and L 2 , so that
is a witness to the consistency of L 1 and L 2 . So we need to prove that 1 ∪ 2 → 1 (L) = L 1 and 1 ∪ 2 → 2 (L) = L 2 . As the two cases are symmetric it suffices to prove only the former.
First, we show that
(L 2 )): 
.
(L 1 )) can be shown analogously.
Proof of Theorem 4.8, Part 2: By Part 1 of this theorem, 
(L 2 )) and
By Lemma 2.4, irreducibility is equivalent to consistency; hence, L 1 and L 2 are consistent if and only if L 1 ⊆ 1 ∪ 2 → 1 (
Note that by Part 1 of Theorem 4.6, consistency when U is words over ⊇ 1 ∪ 2 is equivalent to consistency when U is words over 1 ∪ 2 .
